A Bad Job of Doing Good: Does Corporate Transparency on a Country and Company Level Moderate Corporate Social Responsibility Effectiveness? by Heinberg, M et al.
A Bad Job of Doing Good: Does Corporate
Transparency on a Country and Company
Level Moderate Corporate Social
Responsibility Effectiveness?
Martin Heinberg, Yeyi Liu, Xuan Huang, and Andreas B. Eisingerich
Abstract
Numerous studies argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) helps companies build strong and positive relationships with
consumers. However, it is not well understood why certain companies are more effective in their CSR activities than others.
Some studies have attributed this difference to the country setting, but results are inconclusive. Building on signaling theory, this
study explores corporate transparency as a boundary condition of the effects of CSR activities on the consumer–brand rela-
tionship. Three experiments and one large survey across three countries examine how a lack of corporate transparency
undermines firms’ CSR efforts. Importantly, the authors theorize that country environments differ in terms of transparency,
which is then reflected in different levels of corporate transparency. Different country levels of transparency help explain the
discrepancies of CSR effectiveness for increasing brand attachment and building consumer behavior. Finally, the authors tie the
diminishing effect of CSR in the case of low corporate transparency to an increase in consumer skepticism.
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Prior research has suggested that companies’ successes with
corporate social responsibility (CSR) are mixed when it comes
to the influence of CSR efforts on consumer behavior (e.g., Sen
and Bhattacharya 2001). Consumer doubt, for instance, is known
to disrupt CSR effectiveness (e.g., Skarmeas and Leonidou
2013), and we argue that mixed CSR success may be explained
by differences in additional corporate signals consumers use to
alleviate skepticism. According to Julie Sweet, chief executive
officer of Accenture, “Transparency builds trust and it’s critical
in a crisis” (Financial Times 2020). If so, firms may find cor-
porate transparency a suitable facilitator to enhance CSR effec-
tiveness. Building on Liu et al. (2015), we consider corporate
transparency as a firm trait that determines whether the infor-
mation provided is objective and accessible to its stakeholders.
The importance of corporate transparency has been emphasized
in recent business studies in contexts such as accounting (e.g.,
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2004), corporate management
(Bernstein 2017), and service offerings (Liu et al. 2015). How-
ever, despite the increased attention to transparency in business
research, to the best of our knowledge, transparency has been
connected to CSR only as a prerequisite in CSR reporting
(Dubbink, Graafland, and Van Liedekerke 2008; Fernandez-
Feijoo, Romero, and Ruiz 2014). The general influence of
corporate transparency as a boundary condition of CSR effec-
tiveness remains less understood. In particular, it is unclear
whether corporate transparency moderates the central link
between CSR and the consumer–brand relationship (or brand
attachment, our proxy for the latter variable; Kull and Heath
2016).
The international marketing literature has discussed different
moderators to CSR effectiveness but produced inconclusive
results (see Web Appendix 1). Importantly, country environ-
ments differ in terms of their transparency, which sets a
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framework for different levels of corporate transparency (for a
literature review of country-level antecedents of corporate trans-
parency, see Web Appendix 2). Thus, different levels of corpo-
rate transparency by country may help resolve the puzzle of why
there are discrepancies in CSR effectiveness between countries.
Given the rising importance of CSR among today’s businesses,
with CSR spending at approximately $20 billion a year for For-
tune Global 500 firms alone (Meier and Cassar 2018), we
believe that it is important to examine whether and how corpo-
rate transparency serves as a condition for CSR effectiveness.
This study makes several contributions to the current mar-
keting literature. First, it contributes to the literature on corpo-
rate social responsibility. Specifically, we find that
transparency is an important boundary condition of CSR prac-
tices, thus enriching the understanding of when and why CSR
benefits a company. While the marketing literature suggests
that both company-specific factors (e.g., CSR issues, product
quality) and individual-specific factors (e.g., consumers’ per-
sonal support for the CSR issues, their general beliefs about
CSR) interplay with CSR effectiveness (Sen and Bhattacharya
2001), the variable of corporate transparency has not been
identified as a moderator to CSR effectiveness.
Second, we examine potential reasons for a decrease in CSR
effectiveness from the perspective of consumer information
processing. In today’s world, there is a greater risk that con-
sumers will experience information overload than that they will
have insufficient information. Thus, it is important to under-
stand how consumers process corporate signals such as trans-
parency and CSR. Extant studies have established that
consumers may become skeptical about companies’ CSR moti-
vations and intentions (e.g., Skarmeas and Leonidou 2013).
Consumer skepticism, in turn, inhibits the consumer’s relation-
ship with the brand, decreasing brand attachment. According to
our findings, a reason for the negative moderating effect of
corporate transparency is that it stirs consumers’ skepticism
and thus inhibits the usefulness of the signaling effect of CSR.
Finally, the study examines implications of the corporate
transparency moderator for international marketing research.
Corporate transparency has recently been identified as a key
trend of international brand building and management (Steen-
kamp 2020); however, there is only limited knowledge on how
corporate transparency interacts with CSR on an international
level. The international marketing literature that examines the
causes of differing degrees of CSR effectiveness between
countries is confined to arguments related to either the state
of economic development or culture (e.g., Becker-Ohlsen et al.
2011; Choi et al 2016; Web Appendix 1 provides a more
detailed discussion), and results are inconclusive (e.g., Auger
et al. 2010; Eisingerich and Rubera 2010; Jean et al. 2016; Kim
and Choi 2013). Thus, there is a need to consider other poten-
tial moderators that explain differences in CSR effectiveness.
Research has shown that a country’s economic (e.g., Bushman,
Piotroski, and Smith 2004) and cultural (e.g., Griffin et al.
2017) differences can contribute to different levels of corporate
transparency. We thus argue that an important reason for incon-
clusive results is that the proposed moderators of CSR
effectiveness are actually antecedents to a country’s environ-
ment for transparency. In general, previous studies have dis-
cussed only one of these antecedents while ignoring the other,
thus leading to opaque results when one antecedent is not in
line with the other (e.g., cultural values suggest an environment
of low transparency, but development suggests one of high
transparency). By focusing on corporate transparency instead
of its individual antecedents, we enrich the literature on why
CSR effectiveness differs between countries.
The following sections introduce signaling theory as a guid-
ing framework for our study. We then review the relevant
literature on CSR and corporate transparency. Next, we present
four studies that investigate (1) how corporate transparency
moderates the effect of CSR on the consumer–brand relation-
ship (i.e., brand attachment and consumer behavior), (2) how
CSR effectiveness depends on a country’s environment for
transparency, (3) how consumer skepticism mediates the basic
moderated relationship, and (4) how different types of corpo-
rate transparency (i.e., transparency about positive, negative,
and mixed information) influence CSR effectiveness.
Literature Review
Signaling Theory
Signaling theory is built on the foundation that a signal recei-
ver relies on observable information from a signal sender to
reduce uncertainty about unobservable attributes (Spence
1973). The receiver interprets a signal and, depending on the
perceived honesty of the signal, uses it as a proxy for the
unobservable information (Connelly et al. 2011). Importantly,
formal and informal institutions of the signaling environment
influence the entire signaling process, including the signaler,
the signal itself, and the receiver’s interpretation of the signal
(Connelly et al. 2011). In addition, the effectiveness of signals
varies depending on multiple conditions. For example, a firm
may send several signals simultaneously, which may interact
with one another (Steigenberger and Wilhelm 2018). In the
case of two incoherent signals, the receiver may be confused
about or doubt the signal’s genuineness, resulting in less
effective transmission of the signal (Connelly et al. 2011).
Moreover, the receiver tends to cognitively focus more on the
negative signal, thus further distorting the original intent of
signalers and weakening the signal’s effectiveness (Miyazaki,
Grewal, and Goodstein 2005).
CSR as a Signal
Corporate social responsibility reflects the activities of an orga-
nization with respect to its perceived societal obligations,
including environmental stewardship, commitment to diversity
in hiring and promotion, community involvement, cultural
activity sponsorship, and corporate philanthropy (Brown and
Dacin 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). A company’s CSR
efforts do not necessarily reflect an excellent product offering
(Brown and Dacin 1997); however, CSR creates a context for
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customer evaluation (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001), which in
turn may influence how customers think about a company,
positively influence consumer–brand relationships, and moti-
vate them to reward socially responsible companies (Brown
and Dacin 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). In line with the
signaling theory perspective, CSR can be interpreted as a signal
to consumers and other stakeholders because it not only reveals
information about a particular CSR project of the firm but also
alleviates consumer uncertainty in a more general sense (Cher-
nev and Blair 2015). Due to information asymmetry, consu-
mers are unable to judge the moral character of a firm.
Consumers may interpret CSR as a signal for an organization’s
benevolence and good intentions due to the costs and effort of
engaging in CSR activities (Su et al. 2016). In turn, such an
interpretation can improve consumer–brand relationships
(Eisingerich et al. 2011; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Moon,
Lee, and Oh 2015) and strengthen a consumer’s brand attach-
ment (Kull and Heath 2016).
In addition, signaling theory provides several explanations
for low CSR effectiveness, such as low observability of a signal
if consumers are not aware of a firm’s CSR activities (Connelly
et al. 2011), a low fit between the signal and the object (Torelli,
Monga, and Kaikati 2012), or distortions in the signaling envi-
ronment (e.g., by competitors). In our case, we add two specific
reasons: receivers’ interpretation of a signal and coherence
between CSR and other firm signals. Subsequently, we briefly
introduce receiver interpretation and revert to signal coherence
when developing the proposed interaction between CSR and
corporate transparency in the “Hypothesis Development” sec-
tion. According to signaling theory, signal receivers’ interpre-
tation can distort or enhance a signal’s effectiveness (Connelly
et al. 2011). For example, CSR may be interpreted as originat-
ing from moral motives, or instrumental and suspicious ulterior
motives (Ellen, Webb, and Mohr 2006; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli,
and Schwarz 2006). In the case of such an interpretation, con-
sumer skepticism about CSR increases, which diminishes the
return on CSR for the firm (e.g., Skarmeas and Leonidou
2013). In signaling terms, consumers question the honesty of
the signal when they doubt the sincerity of a CSR effort. In
such a case, their relationship to the firm would suffer, and
brand attachment may decrease.
Transparency as a Signal
Corporate transparency. In the context of consumer–brand rela-
tionships, this study focuses more on the recent view of infor-
mation flows from companies to external stakeholders. We
consider corporate transparency a firm trait or value that deter-
mines whether information is objective and accessible to its
stakeholders (Liu et al. 2015). Specifically, companies should
share information that is clear and easily understood and should
facilitate access to third-party information. Companies should
disseminate relevant and valid information that embodies truth,
honesty, frankness, and candor and is without guile or conceal-
ment (Bell, Auh, and Eisingerich 2017; Bennis, Goleman, and
Biederman 2008; O’Toole and Bennis 2009). As such, CSR
and corporate transparency share a common root as a corporate
signal. Consumers may reduce information asymmetry regard-
ing the moral character or benevolence of the firm by relying
on corporate transparency efforts as a cue. If a company is less
open about a certain aspect, it may have a serious reason to
conceal this information, which leads to doubts about the com-
pany’s moral character on a more general level. Conversely,
high corporate transparency enables consumers to obtain clear
and valuable information, which may reduce their perceived
uncertainty in an exchange and increase their general trust (Lin
2007). The quality of the consumer–brand relationship is there-
fore enhanced.
Country environment for transparency. Importantly, according to
signaling theory, formal and informal institutions of the signal-
ing environment influence the signaler, the signal itself, and the
receiver’s interpretation of the signal (Connelly et al. 2011). In
our context, it means that country-level factors, such as economic
development or culture, shape how firms employ transparency
as a signal of benevolence and morality. Such country-level
factors shape differences in a country’s environment for
transparency. The environment may then constitute a frame that
bounds firms from a specific country to a certain extent
(Graafland and Noorderhaven 2020). There may be different
effects of the country environment for transparency onto a
firm’s corporate transparency. Governments could influence the
transparency of firms directly through laws and regulations, or
indirectly by shaping local stakeholders’ behavior. Even in a
globalized world, domestic employees, customers, or investors
often constitute the backbone of a company, and they are thus
important intermediates that transfer the influence of the country
environment for transparency into corporate transparency
(Noorderhaven and Harzing 2003). Finally, the local civil
society and media may function as transmitters between the
country environment and corporate transparency. However,
there is still considerable variance of transparency of firms
within a country, as the corporate transparency signal is
employed differently by firms in their fight for market share
(Griffin et al. 2017). This variance is key so that corporate




The marketing literature has suggested that different variables
can be used to capture consumer–brand relationships, such as
attitude strength and attachment. Among them, brand attach-
ment is often viewed as the ultimate indicator of the consumer–
brand relationship, rather than attitude strength or purchase
intention (e.g., Park, Eisingerich, and Park 2013; Thomson
2006). Consumers have been shown to become attached to
different brands, including product brands, digital service
brands, and country brands (Fritze et al. 2020; Liu et al.
2020). Brand attachment can be defined as the strength of the
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bond connecting the brand with consumers’ self (Park et al.
2010). This brand–self linkage can involve myriad emotional
feelings such as happiness and pride from brand–self display
(Park et al. 2013), which fits with the idea that consumers
examine signals of benevolence and morality about a firm’s
character. It has also been suggested as an important driver of
consumers’ brand loyalty (Khamitov, Wang, and Thomson
2019), brand equity (Heinberg et al. 2020), advocacy, purchase
intention, and actual purchase behavior (Park et al. 2013).
Other variables, such as attitude strength, are a less important
predictor of key behavioral outcome variables (Park et al.
2010). In addition, attitude strength does not correspond as well
as brand attachment to the proposed signaling argument
because it mainly focuses on consumers’ cognitive judgment
of a brand and the confidence with which it is held (Petty,
Brinol, and DeMaree 2007).
Moderation of Corporate Transparency
In line with signaling theory, the effectiveness of a corporate
signal depends on the coherence of different signals from the
same firm (Connelly et al. 2011; Miyazaki, Grewal, and Good-
stein 2005). In our case, we propose that the link between CSR
and brand attachment may be altered depending on different
levels of corporate transparency.
The literature has already identified a relatively obvious link
between transparency and CSR. It is important to design a CSR
policy in a transparent way (Dubbink, Graafland, and Van
Liedekerke 2008) and CSR reporting also needs to be con-
ducted transparently to reach important stakeholders
(Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, and Ruiz 2014). We argue that
transparency, even if it is not related to CSR information
(e.g., transparency about a firm’s products, reputation, or finan-
cial stability), helps consumers gain valuable information to
reduce perceived risk and simplify their decision-making pro-
cess (Lin 2007). In this case, corporate transparency facilitates
the perception of honesty, openness, and a commitment to truth
that is also implicit in CSR-focused thinking. Like CSR, cor-
porate transparency also communicates the company’s self-
transcendent value of caring for others and confidence in its
own products. It stands to reason that a company with some-
thing to hide has less motivation to be transparent (Doorey
2011). Consumers value the extra effort made by a firm to share
critical information openly insofar as it supports their decision-
making process (Bell, Auh, and Eisingerich 2017; Pechmann
1992; Trifts and Häubl 2003). Thus, high transparency
encourages consumers to trust the firm, enhances the positive
effect of CSR, and, in turn, contributes to the consumer–brand
relationship. Formally, we hypothesize the following:
H1: Corporate transparency positively moderates the
effect of CSR on brand attachment.
Moderation of Country Environment for Transparency
The literature has identified a range of country-level factors
that shape corporate transparency. A country’s political
economy and institutional setting affect corporate transparency
(Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2004). The institutional con-
text in a country, for example, contributes to how much infor-
mation firms disclose and whether media and society demand
transparency from firms (Heinberg, Ozkaya, and Taube 2018;
Millar et al. 2005). In addition, a country’s national culture can
influence the level of firm transparency (Davis and Ruhe
2003). Evidently, the country context only constitutes a frame-
work for firms, and there is still considerable variance of cor-
porate transparency within a country (Griffin et al. 2017),
which makes transparency a reliable signal for consumers.
To specifically test whether transparency differences in the
country environment are responsible for differences in the
degree of CSR effectiveness, we consider three countries
(i.e., China, Japan, and the United States) that differ in terms
of country-level antecedents of transparency and, conse-
quently, their level of transparency. According to World Bank
estimates, China has a weaker rule of law and regulatory qual-
ity than either Japan or the United States (World Bank 2018).
Thus, judicial and governmental forces that demand transpar-
ency from firms are expected to be weaker. Similarly, societal
forces that could urge companies into a higher level of trans-
parency (e.g., society, the media) are weaker in China, stronger
in Japan, and strongest in the United States (Reporters Without
Borders 2019).
Several data sources that attempt to measure the level of
corporate transparency confirm our initial logic. According to
our definition, corporate transparency can be directed at differ-
ent stakeholders (e.g., governments, investors, suppliers, cus-
tomers), but because transparency is a trait reflective of a firm’s
values, the transparency level toward certain stakeholders mir-
rors the transparency level toward other stakeholders (Bush-
man, Piotroski, and Smith 2004). As such, available country
indices provide a good indication of how much firms from a
particular country value transparency. For example, the corrup-
tion watchdog Transparency International has found that only
20% of Chinese firms have reported on anticorruption pro-
grams. This figure is higher for firms from Japan (40%) and
even higher for firms in the United States (74%) (Transparency
International 2014). In addition to reporting on corruption,
companies’ transparency is also apparent in their corporate
governance. Standard & Poor’s has assessed publicly listed
firms in numerous countries on dimensions such as corporate
ownership structure, investor rights, financial transparency,
and information disclosure, as well as board and management
structures and processes (Patel and Dallas 2002). Again, Chi-
nese firms score low (45), Japanese firms score medium-high
(61), and U.S. firms score the highest (70) (Cosset, Somé, and
Valéry 2016; Patel, Balic, and Bwakira 2002; Patel and Dallas
2002). PricewaterhouseCoopers has created an “opacity
index.” Opacity can be understood as the opposite of corporate
transparency and has been defined as “the lack of clear, accu-
rate, formal, easily discernible, and widely accepted practices
in the broad arena where business, finance, and government
meet” (Barth et al. 2001). On this metric, China scores the
highest (87), Japan scores in the middle (60), and the U.S. has
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the lowest score (36). The ranking has been updated numerous
times, and while opacity scores fluctuate, the ranking among
the three countries has remained consistent (Kurtzman and
Yago 2009). Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H2: Country environment for transparency influences the
strength of the relationship between CSR and brand
attachment. This relationship is weak in countries with
low levels of transparency, stronger in countries with
medium levels of transparency, and strongest in countries
with high levels of transparency.
Moderated Mediation of Consumer Skepticism
To summarize our previous discussion on signaling theory, both
corporate transparency and CSR activities can signal sincerity or
goodwill and help achieve the desired benefit for a company. In
addition, the signal receiver “uses seemingly unrelated compet-
itive market signals of the signal sender to cross-validate mean-
ings inferred from signals that are of direct concern” (Heil and
Robertson 1991, p. 410).
When a signal is ambiguous, stakeholders start an “attribution
process aimed at uncovering the underlying motive” (Ogunfo-
wora, Stackhouse, and Oh 2018, p. 528). Drawing on this key
idea, we argue that signal incoherence between CSR and corpo-
rate transparency stirs up feelings of ambiguity, thus triggering
consumer skepticism regarding the motive of the signal, which
in turn decreases CSR effectiveness.
According to CSR research, CSR is effective if consumers
perceive a moral (i.e., value-driven) motive for CSR and inef-
fective if consumers perceive an instrumental (i.e., ego-driven)
motive (Ellen, Webb, and Mohr 2006; Wagner, Lutz, and
Weitz 2009). In addition, a perceived moral motivation can
increase CSR effectiveness by decreasing consumer skepticism
(Skarmeas and Leonidou 2013). In signaling theory terms, only
CSR driven by moral motives will indicate an honorable char-
acter of the firm to the consumer, while instrumental CSR
activities will lead consumers to question if the organizational
character of the firm is indeed caring and benevolent—in other
words, if the CSR signal is honest (Su et al. 2016; Vlachos,
Panagopoulos, and Rapp 2013). According to psychological
research, when an actor displays positive behavior but there
appear to be ulterior motives, the behavior is unlikely to be
attributed to the actor’s positive disposition (Yoon, Gürhan-
Canli, and Schwarz 2006). In line with this view, when a com-
pany engages in positive behavior (e.g., CSR activities) in the
hope of building a strong consumer–brand relationship, consu-
mers’ skepticism regarding the signaler’s genuine intention
may be aroused if other contextual information raises suspicion
(e.g., the company does not seem to display sufficient corporate
transparency). Under such conditions, CSR activities may be
ineffective.
H3: Corporate transparency moderates the mediating
effect between CSR, consumer skepticism, and brand
attachment. In the case of high corporate transparency,
the negative link between CSR and skepticism is further
enhanced, thus strengthening the link between CSR and
brand attachment.
Moderation of Types of Transparent Information
It is important to acknowledge the complex nature of transpar-
ency. Transparency pertains to not only how much information
is revealed but also what type. Companies can be transparent
about positive, negative, or mixed (both positive and negative)
information. Research on signaling theory often takes the view
that firms would only deliberately communicate positive infor-
mation and thus “insiders generally do not send . . . negative
signals” (Connelly et al. 2011, p. 45). Thus, there is not much
research on how disclosing mixed and negative information
could influence the effect of transparency. Some early evidence
suggests that the type of information firms disclose influences
the effect of transparency (e.g., Fabrizio and Kim 2019), but it
is still unclear how the type of disclosed information influences
transparency’s role as a signal.
One would hope that firms would be very transparent and
reveal essentially everything, but it is reasonable to think that
firms will be more transparent about some aspects (e.g., posi-
tive information) of their business and less transparent about
others (e.g., negative information). So, it is important to take
the valence of information into consideration when examining
transparency. According to signaling theory, disclosing mixed
or even negative information may enhance the credibility of the
transparency signal. However, although transparency in such
adverse circumstances may signal honesty and openness, it
may also harm the consistency or clarity of the signal (Erdem
and Swait 1998). Thus, the effects of credibility and consis-
tency of the transparency signal may vary depending on the
type of information conveyed. To better understand the circum-
stances when transparency is advisable, we also examine dif-
ferent types of corporate transparency (i.e., transparency about
positive, negative, and mixed information). Figure 1 sum-
marizes our proposed research model.
Empirical Analysis
To test our hypotheses, we rely on four studies (Table 1). Study
1 tests the moderation of the CSR–brand attachment relation-
ship by corporate transparency in an experiment. Study 2 then
employs survey data and hierarchical modeling to determine
whether Study 1 findings can be expanded to country differ-
ences in terms of corporate transparency. Study 3 aims to
explore the logic of why corporate transparency moderates the
CSR–brand attachment link by examining the mediating role of
consumer skepticism in an experiment. Finally, Study 4 tests
the notion of whether corporate transparency is always an
important moderator, or whether its effect depends on the type
of information a firm shares. To substantiate our results, we
have relied on a behavioral dependent variable in this final
experiment.
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Study 1
Participants and procedure. Study 1 tests the moderating effect of
corporate transparency on the relationship between CSR asso-
ciations and brand attachment in an online experiment. Our
sample comprised 352 participants from China recruited from
the Sojump platform in exchange for monetary compensation
(male ¼ 48%, female ¼ 52%). We selected China because its
country environment is generally associated with low corporate
transparency (Patel and Dallas 2002). Thus, a better under-
standing of the effects of corporate transparency will be par-
ticularly valuable for Chinese firms. In addition, findings from
such a context could provide strong support for the notion that
even in an adverse setting, individual corporate efforts of trans-
parency are possible. We selected Chinese Merchants Bank as
the focal brand, which is a familiar banking brand in China
(Mbrand familiarity¼ 5.26, SD¼ .98; 1¼ “not at all familiar,” and
7¼ “very familiar”). We adopted a 2 (CSR: high vs. control)
2 (transparency: high vs. control) between-subjects design. Par-
ticipants were randomly allocated to one of the conditions. We
controlled for participants’ existing satisfaction and familiarity
with the brand and their involvement with banking, as we are
using a real brand (e.g., Herz and Diamantopoulos 2017). We
primed CSR associations and corporate transparency with read-
ing tasks (see Web Appendix 3). The transparency reading
stimuli were developed from the definition of transparency and
adapted from Liu et al (2015). The CSR reading stimuli were
adapted from the companies’ CSR report. Both tasks were
pretested with experts in transparency and CSR and revised
accordingly. We measured brand attachment as the dependent
variable using a four-item scale (for all measurement items,
see Web Appendix 4) (a ¼ .86; 1 ¼ “strongly disagree,” and
7 ¼ “strongly agree”).
Results. Manipulation check results show that our manipulation of
CSR association (MCSR¼ 5.35, Mcontrol¼ 5.03; t(350)¼ 4.471,
p< .001) and transparency (Mtransparency¼ 5.36, Mcontrol¼ 5.08;
t(350)¼ 4.15, p< .001) using priming was successful. There is no
difference in age (F(1, 352)¼ .580, p> .05) or gender (F(1, 352)
¼ 3.293, p> .05) among the manipulation conditions. In addition,
we control regional differences at the operational level. An anal-
ysis of variance result shows no significant difference on the
variable of interest, brand attachment, among the different Chi-
nese provinces (F (26,325) ¼ .850, p ¼ .680> .05).
Results from an analysis of variance reveal that the main ef-
fects of CSR (MCSR¼ 4.82 vs. Mcontrol¼ 4.50; F(1, 348)¼ 9.83,
p < .01) and corporate transparency (Mtransparency ¼ 4.85 vs.
Mcontrol ¼ 4.48; F(1, 348) ¼ 13.01, p < .001). Moreover,
the CSR  transparency two-way interaction is significant
(F(1, 348) ¼ 9.47, p < .01) such that perceptions of high
corporate transparency increase the difference in brand attach-
ment between high-CSR condition and controls. Specifically,
while brand attachment was significantly higher in the high-
CSR condition than in the control condition under high transpar-
ency (MCSR¼ 5.17 vs. Mcontrol¼ 4.53; t(175)¼ 4.41, p< .001),
the difference between the high-CSR condition and the control
condition was not significant when transparency was at the con-
trol level (MCSR¼ 4.48 vs. Mcontrol¼ 4.47; t(173)¼ .04, p¼ .967)
(see Figure 2). These results establish that perceived corporate
transparency is a boundary condition for the effect of CSR asso-









Figure 1. Conceptual model.
Notes: We examined transparency at the corporate level (H1) and country level
(H2) in Studies 1 and 2, respectively; we tested the moderated mediation (H3)
in Study 3. We explored the effect of different types of transparency (with
positive, negative, and mixed information) in Study 4 by using a behavioral
response.
Table 1. Overview of Studies and Levels of Analysis.
Logic Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4
Independent
variable
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Consumers interpret firm signals
and provide feedback in terms
of enhanced brand attachment
and behavioral changes.
Brand attachment Brand attachment,
consumer skepticism
Brand attachment Newsletter sign-up
behavior
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Study 2
Sampling. As discussed, we selected China, Japan, and the
United States to represent countries with distinct environments
that trigger low, medium, and high levels of corporate trans-
parency, respectively. The three countries represent the largest
economies in the world according to gross domestic product
and, as we have indicated, differ remarkably in terms of trans-
parency in their corporate environments.
We use a multilevel structural equation modeling approach
to test H2 (Hox 2010). This technique enables us to include a
large number of real brands, thus improving the external valid-
ity of our study. In addition, by accounting for a nested data
structure, we avoid the underestimation of standard errors and
thus decrease the probability of Type 1 errors. We selected fast-
moving consumer goods (FMCGs) as an appropriate category
for Study 2 to achieve the generalizability of our findings
beyond services. Consumers tend to be generally familiar with
FMCGs, and many FMCGs are household names (Heinberg,
Ozkaya, and Taube 2016). We excluded brands from categories
specific to particular consumer segments (e.g., infant products,
pets, alcohol). We selected brands using a two-step process.
First, we relied on desk and field research to compile a list of
suitable domestic firms in each market (i.e., those firms with
local headquarters). According to our argument, transparency
in each firm depends on the country context. The country effect
would be strongest for local firms, as neither their transparency
nor CSR policy is influenced by foreign headquarters. Next, we
conducted a pilot study (n ¼ 100 in each country) to ensure
consumer familiarity with FMCG brands associated with each
firm and then selected 22 firms (with a total of 28 associated
brands) in the United States, 22 firms (with a total of 25 asso-
ciated brands) in China, and 27 firms (with a total of 33 asso-
ciated brands) in Japan. We used quota sampling based on age,
gender, and brand in an online panel from a reputable market
research agency for the main study. We confined our sample to
age groups between 18 and 55 years to assure general internet
literacy and to circumvent possible stronger intergenerational
differences in China. Older consumers in China have enjoyed
fewer benefits from economic reforms and often display dis-
tinctive shopping behaviors relative to younger generations
(Heinberg, Ozkaya, and Taube 2016). Overall, we collected
800 valid responses in the United States, 628 in China, and
839 in Japan (approximately 28 per brand), and our samples
represent the countries’ overall populations in terms of gender
and age groups. We surveyed each respondent employing an
online questionnaire only about one brand, which was assigned
using a random process. Respondents first answered questions
about the brand (dependent/control variable) and then about the
CSR of the firm associated with the brand (independent
variable).
Measurement. Measurement of the variables at the individual
level builds on established research. We measured brand
attachment using three items adapted from Batra et al. (2012)
and Park et al. (2010) (“I feel emotionally connected to
[brand],” “I feel a bond to [brand],” and “[Brand] feels like a
good friend”), and our CSR construct is based on the work of
Walsh, Beatty, and Shiu (2009) (“[Firm] seems environmen-
tally responsible,” “[Firm] would reduce its profit to ensure a
clean environment,” and “[Firm] seems to make an effort to
create jobs”) (see Web Appendix 4). We tested whether brand
attachment is significantly correlated to potential demographic
(age, gender, education), or regional variation related con-
founds but only identify a slight positive correlation of educa-
tion and our dependent variable. Therefore, we include
education as a control variable in our further data analysis.
We employed the translation/back-translation method using
bilingual marketing researchers to establish the idiomatic
equivalence of our scales (Hult et al. 2008). Subsequently,
we assessed measurement invariance using a Bayesian estima-
tor to match the estimation of our structural model, which also
relied on a Bayesian approach. For Bayesian models, there is
satisfactory model fit if (1) the posterior predictive p-value is
above the significance threshold (i.e., >.05) and (2) the 95%
confidence interval (CI) of the replicated chi-square includes
zero (Van den Schoot et al. 2013). Using this approach, we
establish configural measurement invariance, full metric invar-
iance, and full scalar invariance (Table 2).
We relied on seven-point Likert scales to assess our items
and tested our scales rigorously for validity and reliability. All
constructs exceeded the average variance extracted threshold
of .5, and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the measures ran-
ged from .792 to .950 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988) (see Table 3). In
addition, we established discriminant validity using Fornell and

























Figure 2. Study 1: Effect of CSR and corporate transparency on brand
attachment.
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Common method testing is not a major concern in our case.
First, we tested the relationships at the individual level in two
experiments, in which we manipulated the independent vari-
able (Studies 1 and 3). Second, our country-level moderators
are formed by assigning the firm’s origin to each of the coun-
tries, which does not cause common method issues. Finally, our
individual-level variables are directed at different entities (i.e.,
brands for our dependent and control variables and firms for
our independent variable), which should decrease potential bias
caused by the common method. However, because these mea-
sures are still examined using the same survey instrument, we
assessed common method bias of our level-one variables by
including a marker variable (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This vari-
able (i.e., the item “Brown is my favorite color”) has no theo-
retical relationship with any variable, and we set the
relationship between the marker variable and our remaining
level-one variables to equal strength. The effect size of the
loading is small (.042), and including this factor has only a
negligible effect on our results; most importantly, it does not
change our hypothesized relationships. Therefore, we conclude
that common method testing of our individual-level variables is
not a serious concern in our case. In addition, we examined the
variance inflation factor to test for multicollinearity and find a
value of 1.051, well below the generally accepted cutoff of 10
(Hair et al. 2010).
Results. We use a Bayesian multilevel structural equation mod-
eling approach to explore the effect of corporate differences
rooted in firm origins on the CSR–brand attachment
relationship (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2004). We
assessed relationships using 95% credibility intervals and the
default diffuse priors in Mplus (i.e., normal for b and inverse
gamma for s2; Muthén and Muthén 2017). Research has shown
that these priors are accurate and superior to the maximum
likelihood–based method, especially for complex models such
as multilevel structural equation models (Rupp, Dey, and
Zumbo 2004). Following Heinberg, Ozkaya, and Taube
(2016), we apply a stepwise procedure (see Table 4). First,
we examine firm-level variance in relation to individual-level
variance (null model) and obtain a coefficient of .199, which is
generally regarded as medium-sized (Hox 2010). Next, we add
our individual-level variables (fixed effects individual level).
The random-effects models then add a random intercept and
finally the random slope. All models reveal an increase in
model fit and a steady decline of residual variance (Table 4),
which provides support for the proposed model (Heinberg,
Ozkaya, and Taube 2016).
To examine H2, we first assess the effect between CSR and
brand attachment, which is significant (B ¼ .523; 95% Baye-
sian credibility interval ¼ [.491, .555]). Our hypothesis pre-
dicts the strongest relationship between CSR and brand
attachment for U.S. firms, a weaker relationship for Japanese
firms, and the weakest relationship for Chinese firms. We used
dummy coding to test the difference between the United States
and Japan and between China and Japan. In support of H2, the
relationship between CSR and brand attachment is signifi-
cantly stronger for the first dummy variable (United States
vs. Japan: B ¼ .878; 95% Bayesian credibility interval ¼
[.580, .999]) and significantly weaker for the second dummy
variable (China vs. Japan: B¼ –.480; 95% Bayesian credibility
interval ¼ [–.727, –.222]).
Additional analyses. To gain additional support for our logic that
the country differences in the CSR–brand attachment relation-
ship are indeed rooted in differences of corporate transparency,
we have identified a proxy measure for corporate transparency
(see Web Appendix 5). Results confirm a weaker level of cor-
porate transparency in China, a medium one in Japan, and a
higher one in the United States. In addition, we find that cor-
porate transparency moderates the effect of CSR on brand
attachment.
To further consider the implications of our results for inter-
national marketing, we have carried out two additional explora-
tions. First, as explained previously, we have included only
















United States 25 [13.488, 23.844] .539 12,893.05
China 25 [4.215, 29.963] .094 9,237.65
Japan 25 [20.894, 18.686] .500 11,964.77
Metric (full) 79 [19.019, 53.490] .180 8,086.95
Scalar (full) 81 [27.036, 48.131] .314 3,071.231
Notes: DIC ¼ deviance information criterion.
Table 3. Study 2: Correlation Matrix and Summary Statistics.
Mean (SD)
Composite Reliability/
Cronbach’s Alpha 1 2 3 4
1. Education 4.771 (.717) —/— — .003 .010 .000
2. Brand attachment 4.085 (1.482) .950/.950 .058* .866 .093 .324
3. Familiarity 5.438 (1.181) .789/.792 .099* .305* .558 .040
4. CSR of firm 4.601 (.903) .897/.896 .002 .569* .200* .747
*p < .05.
Notes: Average variances extracted are on the boldfaced diagonal; squared correlations are above the diagonal; correlations are below the diagonal.
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domestic firms in our sample to achieve a clear country envi-
ronment effect and avoid bias of a potential foreign influence
on a firm’s CSR or transparency policy. In our data collection,
we have also included a limited number of foreign firms, which
enabled us to further test our hypotheses. As developed in Web
Appendix 6, we receive support for our hypotheses, even when
our sample is not limited to domestic firms. Second, such for-
eign influence may also be at play if a domestic firm is active in
foreign markets. We have controlled for such an effect in our
data analysis and receive additional confidence in our hypoth-
esis (see Web Appendix 7).
Study 3
Participants and procedure. Study 3 includes 140 participants
from China, recruited using the Sojump platform for monetary
compensation. We removed 15 invalid responses (e.g., failure
to pass the attention check), leaving a total of 125 valid
responses (male ¼ 47, female ¼ 78). We selected the same
focal brand as in Study 1. We employed a single-factor (CSR:
high vs. control) between-subjects design. We manipulated
consumers’ CSR associations as in Study 1. We measured
transparency as a continuous variable in Study 3 to reveal a
better perspective on the boundary of the moderating effect.
After priming, participants reported their evaluation of corpo-
rate transparency associations and assessed their skepticism
and brand attachment. We measured corporate transparency
with a four-item scale developed by Liu et al. (2015) (a ¼ .78;
1¼ “strongly disagree,” and 7¼ “strongly agree”; for a complete
list of measurement items, see Web Appendix 4). We measured
skepticism by asking participants to indicate their inferences
about the sincerity of the company’s motive for pursuing the
CSR activity. Specifically, we asked respondents to assess the
following statement: “[Chinese Merchants Bank] does not
sincerely care about consumers’ poverty reduction or environ-
mental protection issues” (adapted from Yoon, Gürhan-Canli,
and Schwarz [2006]).
Results. A t-test shows that our manipulation of CSR association
using priming was successful (MCSR ¼ 5.68, Mcontrol ¼ 5.31;
t(120) ¼ 2.38, p < .05). In addition, we did not identify any
significant differences between the CSR group and the control
group for the control variables: familiarity (MCSR ¼ 5.56,
Mcontrol ¼ 5.55; t(123) ¼ .04, n.s.), attitude (MCSR ¼ 5.77,
Mcontrol ¼ 5.78; t(123) ¼ .09, n.s.), and satisfaction
(MCSR ¼ 5.80, Mcontrol ¼ 5.65; t(123) ¼ 1.04, n.s.).
We hypothesized that skepticism mediates the effect of CSR
on brand attachment and that transparency moderates the path
between CSR and skepticism. We tested this moderated media-
tion model using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro for Model 7
with 5,000 bootstrapped samples (see Table 5). In support of
H3, PROCESS results show evidence of a significant moderat-
ing effect of transparency on the relationships between CSR
and skepticism (B ¼ .45, SE ¼ .19; t ¼ 2.41, p < .05). In
addition, controlling for CSR, we find that skepticism had a
significant effect on brand attachment (B ¼ .49, SE ¼ .07;
t ¼ 7.48, p < .001), while the direct effect of CSR on brand
attachment is reduced to nonsignificance (B¼ .13, SE ¼ .13;
t ¼ .98, p ¼ .33) after including skepticism.
PROCESS also allowed for a deeper probing of the moder-
ating effect of transparency on the CSR–skepticism relation-
ship (Table 6). Specifically, it allowed for inferential tests of
the effect at the quantiles. We find evidence for a significant
indirect effect of CSR on brand attachment at the higher
levels of transparency (50th percentile of transparency: 95%
CI ¼ [.07, .37]; 84th percentile of transparency: 95%
CI ¼ [.14,.63]). We did not obtain a significant effect for the
lower level of transparency (16th percentile of transparency:





HypothesisIntercepts Only Full Firm Level
Individual Level
Education ! Brand attachment .074* [.036, .106] .011 [–.010, .037] .021 [–.014, .053]
Brand familiarity ! Brand attachment .223* [.179, .262] .311* [.268, .352] .311* [.269, .356]
CSR of firm ! Brand attachment .523* [.491, .555] .452* [.420, .490] .451* [.404, .481]
Firm Level
China vs. Japan ! Intercept brand attachment .875* [.781, .942] .959* [.864, 1.032]
United States vs. Japan ! Intercept brand attachment .085 [.061, .217] .185* [.033, .386]
China vs. Japan ! Slope brand attachment .480* [.727, .222] H2







Free parameters 34 43 49
DIC 56,785.377 56,603.547 56,522.922
*p < .05.
Notes: DIC ¼ deviance information criterion.
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95% CI ¼ [.14, .23]) (see details in Figure 3). The results
indicate that when transparency is high, CSR positively influ-
ences brand attachment via reduced skepticism; however, when
transparency is low, CSR does not positively influence brand
attachment.
Study 4
Study 4 extends our findings in two ways. First, it examines an
actual behavioral response, as this is logically connected to
brand attachment (Park et al. 2013) and key to marketers’
interests. Second, the study examines different types of corpo-
rate transparency (i.e., transparency about positive, negative,
and mixed (i.e., both positive and negative) information) to
better understand the circumstances when transparency is
advisable.
Participants and procedure. One hundred ninety-five students
participated in the study as part of a regular course at a univer-
sity. They were incentivized with a draw for twenty Amazon
vouchers at a total value of US$100. Fifteen participants were
removed (nine failed the attention check, four guessed the
study purpose, and two indicated that they had done a similar
study before), leaving a final sample size of 180 (88 male, 66
female, 19 other, 7 prefer not to say).
We employed a single-factor (transparency types: high trans-
parency about positive information, high transparency about
negative information, high transparency about mixed
information, low transparency, and control) between-subjects
design. We selected McDonald’s as the focal brand due to its
general familiarity. We measured participants’ CSR associations
with McDonald’s at the beginning of the study with a scale
adapted from Stanaland, Lwin, and Murphy (2011). Then, we
provided readings to participants about how product recalls
could have different implications for a company (positive vs.





B (SE) t B (SE) t
Constant 3.05 (.11) 28.34*** 6.44 (.22) 29.30***
CSR .41 (.15) 2.71** .13 (.13) .98***
Transparency .39 (.14) 2.86** — —
Skepticism — — .49 (.07) 7.48***
CSR  transparency .45 (.19) 2.41* — —
R-square .32 .32




Notes: DV ¼ dependent variable.
Table 6. Study 3: Conditional Effect of CSR on Brand Attachment via
Skepticism.
Conditions: Transparency B (SE) CI
16th percentile .05 (.09) [.14, .23]
50th percentile .21 (.08) [.07, .37]
84th percentile .38 (.12) [.14, .63]
Notes: Dependent variable ¼ brand attachment; independent variable ¼ CSR
prime.
A: Simple Slopes Graph























































Figure 3. Study 3: Effect of CSR on skepticism at different levels of
corporate transparency.
Notes: Values of skepticism at different levels of corporate transparency (16th,
50th, and 84th percentiles). Johnson–Neyman value ¼ 5.226.
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negative vs. mixed) to prime participants’ perception of product
recall information for the three high-transparency conditions
(transparency about positive information vs. negative informa-
tion vs. mixed information). Then, they all read an excerpt about
how McDonald’s had experienced a major product recall and
been transparent. For the low-transparency conditions, partici-
pants directly read an excerpt about how McDonald’s had expe-
rienced a major product recall and not been transparent about it.
In addition, we included a control group, who did not read
anything. By doing so, we manipulated different types of trans-
parency with the same product recall scenarios to avoid potential
confounding (see Web Appendix 8).
Participants then saw an option of checking the box to sign
up for newsletters about updates from McDonald’s. They could
decide to sign up or not. We also examined the success of the
perceived McDonald’s transparency manipulation employing
an adapted scale from Liu et al. (2015). Next, we checked the
manipulation of information positivity by asking them what
they thought would be the long-term implications of product
recalls for a company (from “bad/negative/unfavorable” to
“good/positive/favorable”). Finally, we also measured some
control variables, including participants’ familiarity with and
attitude toward McDonald’s, and believability of the excerpts
about McDonald’s they just read.
Results. Manipulation check results show a significant difference
in transparency among different conditions (F(3, 140) ¼ 7.48,
p< .001; Mhigh trans pos¼ 4.28, Mhigh trans neg¼ 4.12, Mhigh trans mix
¼ 3.96, Mlow trans¼ 2.75) and a significant difference in perceived
positivity of the information (F(3, 140) ¼ 13.98, p < .001;
M high trans pos ¼ 4.92, Mhigh trans neg ¼ 2.46, Mhigh trans mix ¼
3.65, Mlow trans ¼ 3.76), confirming that our manipulation is
successful.
We ran a logistic regression using PROCESS Model 1, with
newsletter sign-up behavior as the dependent variable, CSR as
the independent variable, and transparency type as moderator.
We included brand familiarity, attitude, and excerpts’ believ-
ability as control variables. As Table 7 shows, the logistic
regression is significant (w2 ¼ 57.53, d.f. ¼ 12, p < .001; Cox
and Snell R2 ¼ .27, Nagelkerke R2 ¼ .42). In addition, the
interaction between CSR and transparency types is significant
(w2 ¼ 16.93, d.f. ¼ 3, p < .01). Table 8 and Figure 4 provide
detailed results on the effect of CSR across different types of
transparency.
The results show that sign-up for newsletters is higher for
higher CSR associations, only when the company is being
transparent about either positive (B ¼ 1.01, Z ¼ 2.17, p < .05)
or mixed (both positive and negative; B¼ .78, Z¼ 2.37, p< .05)
information. When there is no transparency information (control,
p¼ .27) or when the company is being transparent about negative
information (p ¼ .35), CSR associations do not necessarily gen-
erate newsletter sign-up. More importantly, when the company is
low in transparency, CSR associations show a marginally signif-
icant negative effect on newsletter sign-up (B¼1.26, SE¼ .68,
Z¼ 1.84, p¼ .07). The results indicate that only when a com-
pany is transparent about positive or mixed information is a CSR
initiative effective; when the transparency is about negative infor-
mation, it at least does not hurt the company’s CSR efforts. How-
ever, when the company is nontransparent, CSR efforts could
potentially backfire.
A potential explanation for our results can be found in sig-
naling theory. According to our argument, corporate transpar-
ency can facilitate CSR effectiveness because it reduces
information asymmetry with regard to the moral character or
benevolence of the firm. We explained this effect with the
rationale that transparency suppresses skepticism about the
signal sender’s intention. While transparency about mixed or
even negative information may seem like a sign of honesty and
openness, the information itself may also raise suspicion
among the signal’s recipients, potentially rendering the trans-
parency signal ineffective. In terms of signaling theory, the
consistency of the signal may be harmed (Connelly et al.
2011). Research has shown that the degree to which each com-
ponent reflects the intended whole is an important factor that
influences the clarity of a signal (Erdem and Swait 1998). In a
Table 7. Study 4: Logistic Regression of Newsletter Sign-Up on CSR
and Transparency.
B SE Z p
Constant 1.65 .93 1.77 .08
Controls
Familiarity .17 .12 1.39 .16
Attitude .49 .11 4.50 .00
Believability .10 .17 .56 .57
IVs
CSR 1.01 .46 2.17 .03
W1 .75 .66 1.14 .25
W2 .13 .64 .21 .84
W3 2.73 1.12 2.43 .02
W4 1.29 .72 1.78 .08
CSR W1 .65 .61 1.06 .29
CSR W2 .23 .56 .40 .69
CSR W3 2.27 .84 2.70 .01
CSR W4 1.44 .61 2.37 .02
Notes: IV ¼ independent variable. Dependent variable ¼ probability of signing
up for the newsletter. Coding for the categorical transparency type variable for
analysis: high transparency positive: W1 ¼ 0, W2 ¼ 0, W3 ¼ 0, W4 ¼ 0; high
transparency negative: W1 ¼ 1, W2 ¼ 0, W3 ¼ 0, W4 ¼ 0; high transparency
mixed: W1 ¼ 0, W2 ¼ 1, W3 ¼ 0, W4 ¼ 0; low transparency: W1 ¼ 0,
W2 ¼ 0, W3 ¼ 1, W4 ¼ 0; control: W1 ¼ 0, W2 ¼ 0, W3 ¼ 0, W4 ¼ 1.
Table 8. Study 4: Effect of CSR on Newsletter Signing Up Across
Transparency Types.
Transparency Types B SE Z p
High transparency positive 1.01 .46 2.17 .03
High transparency mixed .78 .33 2.37 .02
High transparency negative .36 .39 .93 .35
Low transparency 1.26 .68 1.84 .07
Control .43 .39 1.10 .27
Notes: Dependent variable ¼ probability of signing up newsletter; independent
variable ¼ CSR.
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nutshell, transparency about mixed or negative information
may convey inconsistency and ambiguity and thus attenuate
the intended signal about benevolence and morality.
Discussion and Implications
Theoretical Contributions
This study makes several theoretical contributions. First, it
contributes to recent research on corporate transparency. Given
today’s proliferation of information technology and social
media, consumers demand greater transparency from compa-
nies (Liu et al. 2015). We show that transparency not only is
important for its direct benefit but also signals consumers about
the sincerity of a firm’s social responsibility practices. Corpo-
rate transparency is thus a boundary condition for the effect of
CSR activities, such that CSR activities that are not aligned
with transparency practices yield limited benefit to firms. We
link the two signals of corporate transparency and CSR to
enrich the understanding of when CSR benefits a company.
While prior research has identified transparency as a prerequi-
site in CSR reporting (Dubbink, Graafland, and Van Liede-
kerke 2008; Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, and Ruiz 2014), the
boundary condition of corporate transparency for CSR effec-
tiveness has not been discussed. Our findings also enrich the
understanding of the role of different types of corporate trans-
parency in relation to positive, negative, and mixed informa-
tion. We find that transparency is only beneficial for a firm in
terms of raising CSR effectiveness in the case of positive and
mixed information. While low transparency lowers the effects
of a firm’s CSR efforts, transparency in the case of negative
information does not interact with CSR and thus does not
appear to harm a firm’s CSR efforts.
Second, we examine the boundary condition of CSR effec-
tiveness from the perspective of information processing at an
individual level. Today’s state of information inundation has
made a deluge of information available to consumers. As such,
consumers have a higher standard for information, both in
terms of what information is provided and the manner in which
the company provides it. Thus, when making decisions, con-
sumers rely on specific company signals, such as corporate
transparency and CSR. In the case of conflicting signals, con-
sumers try to uncover the underlying motives of signaling. This
process can be particularly harmful to CSR-related signals, as
skepticism with regard to the motive of doing good is a key
reason for poor CSR effectiveness (Skarmeas and Leonidou
2013). We argue that consumers tend to question the honesty
of a signal when it is not cohesive with other signals from the
same sender, and we demonstrate that consumer skepticism
regarding the genuineness of the signal increases when corpo-
rate transparency is not in line with CSR. Our research thus
echoes prior studies directed at disentangling the importance of
moral motives for CSR (Ellen, Webb, and Mohr 2006; Wagner,
Lutz, and Weitz 2009). We extend extant knowledge by iden-
tifying corporate transparency as a key mechanism to help
firms manage consumer suspicions with regard to CSR
motives. We demonstrate that if a company performs well in
both CSR and corporate transparency domains, consumer skep-
ticism will be suppressed, thus enhancing the link between
CSR and brand attachment.
Finally, this study contributes to the international marketing
literature by proposing a new country-level moderator that
addresses why CSR is more effective in certain countries than
others. Specifically, we demonstrate that CSR is most effective
for creating brand attachment in countries with high corporate
transparency (e.g., the United States) and least effective in
countries with low corporate transparency (e.g., China).
Although corporate transparency has been named as one of the
key trends in international branding (Steenkamp 2020), previ-
ous studies have generally investigated only one of the poten-
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High transparency (positive) .10 .30 .64
High transparency (negative) .11 .17 .25
High transparency (mixed) .12 .28 .53











Figure 4. Study 4: Effect of CSR on newsletter sign-up behavior across transparency types.
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environment for transparency (e.g., economic or institutional
development, culture) but ignored the role of the environment
itself. Understandably, a country might perform differently in
terms of these antecedents, which would help explain conflict-
ing findings in the literature (Auger et al. 2010; Eisingerich and
Rubera 2010; Jean et al. 2016; Kim and Choi 2013).
Managerial Implications
This study highlights important points for company managers
to achieve their desired outcomes from CSR activities. We
establish that corporate transparency is a necessary condition
for CSR effectiveness. Organizations should be careful when
initiating CSR activities without coherent transparency prac-
tices, as expensive CSR activities may have no benefit. The
findings suggest that businesses struggling to benefit from their
CSR investments and activities should examine their
transparency-relevant activities. In this sense, we suggest that
transparency functions as a precondition for CSR so that con-
sumers will respond positively to an organization’s CSR efforts
only if they can “see through” the company and quickly iden-
tify and process valuable information. Importantly, consumers’
demand for transparency not only is related to CSR information
but also includes all related fields of business activity. For
example, there may be touchpoints related to transparency with
regard to a firm’s own product portfolio, third-party product
reviews, a firm’s balance sheet, and a firm’s lawful behavior.
In addition, our findings demonstrate that consumers
appreciate signal coherence, which helps decrease their skepti-
cism with regard to the honesty of a signal. Organizations
should thus investigate different marketing activities jointly
to maintain coherent signals and trace reasons for consumer
skepticism. For example, CSR initiatives should be examined
in conjunction with other communication activities. Otherwise,
ambiguity among signals may lead consumers to doubt an
organization’s goodwill and discourage them from building a
strong relationship with its brand.
Moreover, previous studies also indicate corporate trans-
parency as an outcome of national difference. Following this
logic, this study further examines the interacting effects of
national transparency and CSR in China, Japan, and the
United States. As such, corporate transparency is an important
issue for both policy makers and managers. Policy makers can
help shape a more transparent environment, for example, by
enabling media and society to effectively monitor a firm’s
behavior or by encouraging standards for corporate govern-
ance. Managers need to recognize that corporate transparency
is a valuable asset even under adverse circumstances such as
reporting mixed (i.e., both positive and negative) information
or in an environment that might be lacking in transparency (as
exemplified in two experimental studies taking China as a
case). By doing so, they can increase consumer attachment
directly and improve the effectiveness of other corporate sig-
nals such as CSR.
Limitations and Further Research
There are some limitations to this study, which highlight pro-
mising avenues for future research. First, our country sample is
too small to examine which antecedents of the country envi-
ronment for transparency (i.e., economic/institutional develop-
ment and culture) are meaningful and how they interact. While
initial research has addressed questions related to individual
antecedents of corporate transparency (e.g., Bushman, Pio-
troski, and Smith 2004; Griffin et al. 2017), a country-level
study that considers the interplay of antecedents of corporate
transparency in relation to the effectiveness of CSR could pro-
vide useful insights. In addition, a larger sample size at the
country level would also enable insights into more detailed
factors of corporate transparency like the legal environment,
media, consumer activism, and economic imbalances. Further-
more, it would be interesting to investigate cases of firms that
strongly deviate from the transparency frame set by their coun-
try environment and if there is less variance of corporate trans-
parency in more transparent environments.
Second, we were only able to touch on the effect of a firm’s
international activity to its corporate transparency, and many
important research questions remain. Our preliminary insight
that domestic firms that also sell products beyond their own
borders profit from a stronger CSR–brand attachment effect
(Web Appendix 7) would need to be confirmed by additional
research. Such logic would be similar to findings for CSR, in
which it has been demonstrated that firms tend to upgrade their
CSR when acting in a foreign environment with more advanced
CSR practices (e.g., Kang 2013). Because CSR and corporate
transparency are interacting according to our findings, it would
also be worthwhile to investigate cases in which the interna-
tional target market has a lower CSR standard to examine the
potential moderator of a level of CSR standard in a foreign
country. Moreover, as indicated in our additional analyses sec-
tion, when examining a sample of foreign brands separately, we
did not find significant differences between countries. Future
research is needed to investigate if this effect is due to different
consumer expectations toward the transparency of foreign
brands, or the wider variance of corporate transparency of firms
originating from diverse countries. In addition, investigating
the role of foreign brands in elevating corporate transparency
of domestic competitors would be a worthwhile avenue of
research.
Third, future research is needed to provide a more granular
picture of the overall results we presented. For example, we
tested the country moderation separately from the moderated
mediation analysis via consumer skepticism. Future research is
necessary to confirm these findings in a combined study and
add robustness to our study, which employed a one-item mea-
surement of consumer skepticism. In addition, building on the
logic that corporate transparency and CSR are separate signals,
we examined corporate transparency as a moderator. However,
potential additional relationships between these variables (e.g.,
as a mediator) or in terms of the fit between both variables
deserve attention. Furthermore, we identified culture as an
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antecedent of corporate transparency. While we found support
for differences between countries, our preliminary tests of
regional variation did not indicate significant effects. Future
research would need to confirm these results and investigate
potential reasons. Are cross-cultural differences simply larger
than subcultural differences, or is corporate transparency deter-
mined by a country’s culture because a firm’s business activity
is often not limited to one region in a country? Another area
that deserves additional research is generational differences.
Our results suggest no significant differences between genera-
tions for the CSR–brand attachment relationship. However, we
find some evidence that there may be a three-way interaction
between the country, consumer age, and the CSR effect. This
could indicate stronger intergenerational differences in emer-
ging markets compared with developed markets and thus
demands future research. Finally, our finding that the type of
information a firm is transparent about (good/mixed/bad) mod-
erates CSR effectiveness would need to be extended to an
international context. In such a study, types of transparency
should also be manipulated with a different scenario to add
robustness to our findings.
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